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The Chaotic State of the Law of 
Rape in Victoria: A Mandate for 
Reform
Kenneth J. Arenson*
Abstract This article is intended as a final commentary and sequel to two 
earlier articles in this journal that have examined the arcane and circular 
wording of s. 37AA of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) and its patent incompatibility 
with ss 36 and 38 of that Act that define the elements of rape. In particular, 
this article will revisit many of the essential points raised in the first two 
articles in order to afford readers with an appropriate backdrop against 
which the Victorian Court of Appeal’s decision in GC v The Queen will be 
examined. The article concludes with a strenuous recommendation that  
s. 37AA be repealed or substantially amended in order to comport with  
ss 36 and 38 as well as the Court of Appeal’s decision in NT v The Queen  
that significantly reshaped the Morgan principle.
Keywords Rape; Consent; Genuine belief in consent; Morgan principle; 
Sexual offences
Prior to 1981, rape in Victoria was a common law offence that consisted of 
carnal knowledge 1 of a woman against her will.2 As the words ‘against her 
will’ wrongly implied that some form of resistance on the part of the 
complainant was necessary for a rape to occur,3 the courts ultimately 
replaced those words with ‘without her consent’4 to accurately reflect the 
elements of rape as it now exists at both common law and under the 
various statutory versions of rape such as, for example, s. 38 of the Crimes 
Act 1958 (Vic). It is important to note that acts of forcible sodomy are not 
classified as rape at common law because they involve penetration of 
orifices other than the vaginal cavity.5 Thus, such acts were made criminal 
only by virtue of the statutory offence of buggery that was inexplicably 
* Associate Professor, Deakin University School of Law; e-mail: karenson3@gmail.com. I 
would like to thank my research assistants, Nicole Rowan and Tess Blackie, for their 
excellent contributions to this article.
1 At common law, carnal knowledge denotes any amount of penile penetration, however 
slight, of the vaginal, anal or oral cavity of a female: Holland v The Queen (1993) 67 ALJR 
946. Thus, the common law crime of rape could only be perpetrated by a man against a 
woman as a principal in the first degree. A woman could be guilty of raping another 
woman, but only as a joint principal in the first degree or as an accessory, whether as a 
principal in the second degree or an accessory before the fact: K. J. Arenson, M. Bagaric 
and P. Gillies, Australian Criminal Law in the Common Law Jurisdictions: Cases and Materials, 
3rd edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2011) 300. 
2 Arenson, Bagaric and Gillies, above n. 1 at 299, citing Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, vol. 1, 626.
3 Arenson, Bagaric and Gillies, above n. 1 at 299, citing L. Waller and C. R. Williams, 
Criminal Law: Text and Cases, 9th edn (LexisNexis: 2001) 89–90.
4 At common law, consent is defined as free and conscious permission: R v Wilkes and 
Bryant [1965] VR 475 at 480. Thus, if the complainant accedes to sexual penetration out 
of force, fear of force or any other type of harm, no consent has been given.
5 Arenson, Bagaric and Gillies, above n. 1 at 299.
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viewed as a less serious crime than rape as evidenced by the fact that it was 
punishable by a lower maximum period of imprisonment and/or fine.6 As 
acts of forcible sodomy are no less invidious than carnal knowledge of a 
woman without her consent, all Australian jurisdictions have now 
repealed the crime of buggery7 and enacted legislation that extends the 
ambit of rape to all forms of non-consensual sexual penetration.8 Aside 
from the aforementioned changes, other antiquated relics of rape at 
common law that have been abolished in recent decades are: a man 
was legally immune from raping his lawfully wedded spouse unless they 
were separated at the time pursuant to a court order;9 a boy under the 
age of 14 was conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing the 
crime of rape;10 and a woman who had consented to carnal knowledge 
could not thereafter revoke the same until after the carnal knowledge had 
ceased.11
Insofar as the requisite mens rea for rape at common law is concerned, 
it was held by the House of Lords in DPP v Morgan12 that the accused must 
act with an intention to have carnal knowledge of the complainant 
without her consent.13 This was construed as meaning that the accused 
intended to have carnal knowledge of the complainant without her 
consent while aware that she was not or might not be consenting to the 
sexual act.14 In writing for the majority in Morgan, Lord Hailsham further 
opined that an accused’s genuine belief that the complainant is consenting 
is dissonant with the foregoing mens rea, and this is true irrespective of 
whether the alleged belief in consent would have been held by a reasonable 
person in the position of the accused.15 His Lordship was careful to 
emphasise, however, that the reasonableness or lack thereof of the putative 
belief is not totally bereft of relevance in rape prosecutions; rather, it is a 
 6 For example, the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (UK), s. 1(1) specified a maximum penalty 
of life imprisonment for rape while forced buggery (s. 12(1)) attracted as little as 10 
years as a maximum penalty where the victim was an adult male.
 7 The Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) makes clear that buggery is no longer a criminal offence  
(s. 59). The issue of the legalisation of buggery is often conflated with discussions of the 
history of homosexuality in the law and thus hard to trace independently. Buggery 
between two consenting adults was made absolutely legal in all Australian jurisdictions 
with the enactment of the Criminal Code Amendment Act 1997 (Tas).
 8 See, e.g., Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s. 349; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 
(WA), s. 319 (which defines sexual penetration) and s. 325 (which makes sexual 
penetration without consent a crime); Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 61H–61I. Although in 
New Zealand rape is defined as:
‘… the penetration of person B’s genitalia by person A’s penis,—
(a) without person B’s consent to the connection; and
(b) without believing on reasonable grounds that person B consents to the 
connection’.
See the Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), s. 128(2).
 9 Repealed in Victoria by the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s. 62(2).
10 Repealed in Victoria by the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s. 62(1).
11 Repealed in the relevant jurisdictions by Kaitamaki v The Queen [1984] 2 All ER 435; 
Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), s. 128(5)(c); Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s. 61H(1)(d); Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s. 5; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s. 38(2)(b) and (3)(b).
12 DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182.
13 Consent having the meaning of free and conscious permission, as noted above: R v 
Wilkes and Bryant [1965] VR 475 at 480.
14 DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182 at 208–9.
15 Ibid. at 210.
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relevant factor to be considered by the jury in determining whether such 
a belief was actually held by the accused.16
The principle enunciated in Morgan was widely accepted for some 36 
years, albeit not uncritically.17 One such criticism is that carnal knowledge 
of a woman without her consent should suffice to convict for rape 
irrespective of whether the accused is aware that the complainant is not or 
might not be consenting. Under this view, the complainant has been 
intractably violated and it is simply no answer that the accused acted with 
an honestly held, though not necessarily reasonable belief, that the 
complainant was consenting to the sexual penetration. Nonetheless, until 
the 2012 decisions of the High Court and Victorian Court of Appeal in The 
Queen v Getachew18 and NT v The Queen19 respectively, the Morgan principle 
was reaffirmed in a long line of appellate court decisions in Victoria20 and 
elsewhere.21
The discussion to follow will examine Victoria’s rape provisions and the 
extent to which the recent decisions of the High Court and Victorian Court 
of Appeal have altered the Morgan principle insofar as it relates to the 
crime of rape at both common law and under Victoria’s statutory analogue 
to the same.22 Further, special attention will focus on the Crimes 
Amendment (Rape) Act 2007 (Vic) which has profoundly impacted the 
law of rape in Victoria, most notably through the introduction of s. 37 and 
s. 37AA(b)(i) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)23 which require that juries 
receive certain directions in rape prosecutions, particularly when the 
accused adduces evidence that he or she acted with a genuine belief 
that the complainant was consenting to the sexual penetration at issue.24 
In particular, special attention will focus on whether the wording of 
s. 37AA(b)(i) can be reconciled with a recent line of Victorian Court of 
Appeal decisions construing this subsection as it relates to ss 35–38 of the 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) which set forth the elements of rape and the 
16 Above n. 14 at 214.
17 See, e.g., H. Power, ‘Towards a Redefinition of the Mens Rea of Rape’ (2003) 23 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 379 arguing that those who make unreasonable mistakes in the 
context of sexual crimes are morally culpable; S. Leahy, ‘When Honest is not Good 
Enough: The Need for Reform of the Honest Belief Defence in Irish Rape Law’ (2013) 
23 Irish Criminal Law Journal 2.
18 The Queen v Getachew (2012) 286 ALR 196 at [27] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel 
and Bell JJ).
19 NT v The Queen [2012] VSCA 213 (6 September 2012).
20 The Morgan principle was adopted by the Victorian Court of Appeal in R v Saragozza 
[1984] VR 187 and reaffirmed by the court in a more recent series of decisions: R v Zilm 
(2006) 14 VR 11; Worsnop v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 187; Roberts v The Queen [2011] 
VSCA 162 (2 June 2011); Neal v The Queen (2010) 32 VR 454; Wilson v The Queen (2011) 
33 VR 340.
21 See, e.g., R v Satnam (1983) 78 Cr App 149; R v Kimber [1983] 1 WLR 1118  
(extending the Morgan principle to charges of indecent assault); R v Brown (1975) 10 
SASR 139.
22 These decisions would also apply in the same manner to the common law and Victorian 
statutory offence of indecent assault under s. 39 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). Readers 
should be reminded that the discussion applies with equal force to the statutory crime 
of indecent assault under s. 39 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) that, with one notable 
variation, codifies the common law offence of indecent assault. The noteworthy 
difference will be addressed below.
23 The Queen v Getachew (2012) 286 ALR 196 at 201.
24 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s. 37AA.
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directions that juries must receive in relation to the elements of consent 
and the accused’s awareness that it was or might have been lacking at the 
time of the sexual penetration at issue.
The impact of The Queen v Getachew and NT v The Queen on 
the Morgan precept
A clear understanding of the High Court’s obiter dicta in The Queen v 
Getachew,25 its subsequent adoption by the Victorian Court of Appeal in NT 
v The Queen26 and its impact on the offence of rape at both common law 
and under the current statutory regime in Victoria,27 is indispensable to an 
understanding of the enormous confusion which the Crimes Amendment 
(Rape) Act 2007 (Vic) has visited upon the law of rape in Victoria. The 
extant statutory offence of rape, as with other sexual offences in Victoria, 
must be examined in the context of the general provisions set out in 
subdivision 8 of Division 1 of Part 1 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic):
38. Rape
(2) A person commits rape if—
(a) he or she intentionally sexually penetrates another person without that 
person’s consent—
(i) while being aware that the person is not consenting or might not be 
consenting; or
(ii) while not giving any thought to whether the person is not 
consenting or might not be consenting; or
(b) after sexual penetration he or she does not withdraw from a person 
who is not consenting on becoming aware that the person is not consenting 
or might not be consenting. 
(3) A person (the offender) also commits rape if he or she compels a person—
(a) to sexually penetrate the offender or another person, irrespective of 
whether the person being sexually penetrated consents to the act; or
(b) who has sexually penetrated the offender or another person, not 
to cease sexually penetrating the offender or that other person, irrespective 
of whether the person who has been sexually penetrated consents to the 
act.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), a person compels another person (the 
victim) to engage in a sexual act if the person compels the victim (by force or 
otherwise) to engage in that act—
(a) without the victim’s consent; and
(b) while—
(i) being aware that the victim is not consenting or might not be 
consenting; or
(ii) not giving any thought to whether the victim is not consenting or 
might not be consenting. 
Section 36 of the Act creates a statutory definition of ‘consent’ as well as a 
list of circumstances in which the complainant’s consent will be deemed as 
lacking. This section provides: 
25 (2012) 286 ALR 196, 203.
26 [2012] VSCA 213 (6 September 2012) at [12]–[16]. 
27 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), ss 35–38.
The Journal of Criminal Law
330
36. Meaning of consent
(1) For the purposes of Subdivisions (8A) to (8D) consent means free 
agreement. Circumstances in which a person does not freely agree to an act 
include the following—
(a) the person submits because of force or the fear of force to that person or 
someone else;
(b) the person submits because of the fear of harm of any type to that 
person or someone else;
(c) the person submits because she or he is unlawfully detained;
(d) the person is asleep, unconscious, or so affected by alcohol or another 
drug as to be incapable of freely agreeing;
(e) the person is incapable of understanding the sexual nature of the act;
(f) the person is mistaken about the sexual nature of the act or the identity 
of the person;
(g) the person mistakenly believes that the act is for medical or hygienic 
purposes.
The High Court in Getachew, addressing the impact and contextual import 
of s. 36, highlighted the following considerations:
The 2007 Act made other important changes to the law that took account of the 
recommendations made by the 2004 Victorian Law Reform Commission report. 
But not all of the recommendations made by that report were reflected in 
amendments made after the report was published. In particular, neither the 
2007 Act nor any of the earlier amendments gave effect to the recommendation 
. . . that what was called ‘[t]he defence of honest belief in consent’ not be 
available ‘where . . . one or more of the circumstances listed in section 36(a)–(g) 
existed and the accused was aware of the existence of such circumstances’. 
Instead, the accused’s awareness of the existence of such a circumstance was 
treated, in the amendments made by the 2007 Act, as a matter about which a 
trial judge was required to direct the jury. The required direction was that the 
jury should consider the accused’s awareness of the section 36 circumstance in 
deciding whether the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that the 
accused was aware that the complainant was not or might not be consenting to 
the sexual act.28
Against this contextual background, the court examined the new version 
of s. 37 that was enacted as part of the 2007 Act. Section 37 provides:
37. Jury directions
(1) If relevant to the facts in issue in a proceeding the judge must direct the jury 
on the matters set out in sections 37AAA and 37AA.
(2) A judge must not give to a jury a direction of a kind referred to in section 
37AAA or 37AA if the direction is not relevant to the facts in issue in the 
proceeding.
(3) A judge must relate any direction given to the jury of a kind referred to in 
section 37AAA or 37AA to—
(a) the facts in issue in the proceeding; and
(b) the elements of the offence being tried in respect of which the direction 
is given—
so as to aid the jury’s comprehension of the direction.
28 The Queen v Getachew [2012] HCA 10, (2012) 286 ALR 196 at [17] (footnote omitted).
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The court then evaluated the purpose and effect of s. 37AA. The relevant 
section states:
[f]or the purposes of section 37, if evidence is led or an assertion is made that 
the accused believed that the complainant was consenting to the sexual act, the 
judge must direct the jury that in considering whether the prosecution has 
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was aware that the 
complainant was not consenting or might not have been consenting, the jury 
must consider—
(a) any evidence of that belief; and
(b) whether that belief was reasonable in all the relevant circumstances 
having regard to—
(i) in the case of a proceeding in which the jury finds that a circumstance 
specified in section 36 exists in relation to the complainant, whether 
the accused was aware that that circumstance existed in relation to the 
complainant; and
(ii) whether the accused took any steps to ascertain whether the 
complainant was consenting or might not be consenting, and if so, the 
nature of those steps; and
(iii) any other relevant matters.
In commenting on s. 37AA, the court emphasised that ‘s. 37AA, when 
read in conjunction with s. 37, required s. 37AA directions to be given 
whenever “evidence is led or an assertion is made that the accused believed 
that the complainant was consenting to the sexual act”’.29 Although the 
court ultimately allowed the prosecution’s appeal on the basis that no such 
evidence was led or assertion made that required a s. 37AA direction,30 it 
is nonetheless true that the court’s judgment in Getachew is of great 
importance because of its obiter dicta comments which, if subsequently 
applied, would effectively overrule the longstanding Morgan precept that 
an accused’s belief that the complainant is consenting to carnal knowledge 
or sexual penetration is mutually exclusive with the requisite mens rea for 
rape at common law and s. 38 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) respectively; 
namely, an awareness that the complainant is not or might not be 
consenting to the relevant carnal knowledge or sexual penetration at 
issue.31 Thus, the court was of the view that a genuine belief in consent is 
not necessarily an answer to rape if the belief accepts or encompasses the 
possibility that the complainant might not be consenting.32
The following passages from the court’s judgment in Getachew serve 
well to further illustrate this point:
Reference to an accused holding the belief that the complainant was consenting 
invites close attention to what was the accused’s state of mind. It was said in the 
Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Bill for the 2007 Act that ‘belief 
in consent and awareness of the possibility of an absence of consent are not 
mutually exclusive’. So much may be accepted if ‘belief in consent’ is treated as 
encompassing a state of mind where the accused accepts that it is possible that 
the complainant might not be consenting…
29 K. J. Arenson, ‘The Queen v Getachew: Rethinking DPP v Morgan’ (2013) 77 JCL 151 at 
157 (quoting The Queen v Getachew [2012] HCA 10, (2012) 286 ALR 196 at [20]).
30 The Queen v Getachew [2012] HCA 10, (2012) 286 ALR 196 at [20].
31 Ibid. at [29]–[37].
32 Ibid. (emphasis not in original source).
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For present purposes, it is enough to notice that, if an accused asserted, or gave 
evidence at trial, that he or she thought or ‘believed’ the complainant was 
consenting, the prosecution may yet demonstrate to the requisite standard 
either that the accused was aware that the complainant might not be consenting 
or that the asserted belief was not held. It is to be recalled that, since the 2007 
Act, the fault element of rape has been identified as the accused being aware 
that the complainant was not or might not be consenting or the accused not 
giving any thought to whether the complainant was not or might not be 
consenting. The reference to an accused’s awareness that the complainant 
might not be consenting is, of course, important. An accused’s belief that the 
complainant may have been consenting, even probably was consenting, is no 
answer to a charge of rape. It is no answer because each of those forms of belief 
demonstrates that the accused was aware that the complainant might not be 
consenting or, at least, did not turn his or her mind to whether the complainant 
might not be consenting.33
As the mens rea for rape at both common law and under s. 38 of the Crimes 
Act 1958 (Vic) requires knowledge or awareness rather than a mere belief 
that the complainant is not or might not be consenting, it is apparent that 
the foregoing obiter dicta cannot be reconciled with the Morgan principle. 
Therefore, an understanding of the clear distinction between the mens reas 
of knowledge and belief is essential to an understanding of the above-
quoted passages from Getachew. This distinction was explained by Professor 
Peter Gillies in his treatise, Criminal Law:
There is a clear conceptual distinction between knowledge and belief. ‘Belief’ as 
opposed to ‘knowledge’ may be used to refer to that state of mind in which D 
holds a fact to be true, but is not entirely free from doubt, while knowledge 
strictly . . . denotes the situation where D does not, having regard to the facts 
known to D, have any doubts as to the existence of the fact in issue. In many 
instances it will be difficult to have knowledge in its strictest sense, as opposed 
to belief—D cannot even be absolutely confident, for example, that D was born 
on the day shown on D’s birth certificate. Nevertheless, D will regard herself or 
himself as ‘knowing’ this date . . . In practice, therefore, there will frequently be 
little difference between situations of ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’.
Thus, by definition the mens rea of belief denotes a state of mind in which 
the accused entertains some measure of doubt as to the existence of 
whatever fact or circumstance that he or she is required to believe 
according to the common law or statutory definition of the offence. If a 
person acts or omits to act (where there is a legal duty to act) with an 
honest belief as contrasted with actual knowledge or awareness concerning 
the existence of a fact or circumstance that makes the relevant conduct 
criminal, he or she is acting with an acceptance that there is a degree of 
doubt with regard to the existence of that fact or circumstance. In legal 
parlance, that acceptance constitutes a mens rea that is commonly referred 
to as recklessness. It is therefore apparent that an accused’s mere belief 
that the complainant was consenting will not necessarily preclude the 
prosecution from proving that mens rea.
Several months subsequent to the High Court’s obiter dicta comments in 
Getachew, the Victorian Court of Appeal elevated those obiter dicta to 
33 Above n. 30 at [26] and [27].
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binding precedent by rejecting the applicant’s claim, based upon the 
Morgan precept, that if the jury accepted his claim that he had acted in the 
belief that the complainant was consenting to the sexual penetration, this 
would have precluded it from finding that the mens rea for rape had been 
proven.34 Citing the High Court’s obiter dicta in Getachew, the Court of 
Appeal reaffirmed the High Court’s view that an honestly held belief in 
consent and an awareness that the complainant was not or might not be 
consenting, or gave no thought whatever to the same, are not mutually 
exclusive of one another.35 In NT, Nettle, Redlich and Osborn JJA opined:
Directions along those lines may well have been desirable to provide the jury 
with further assistance. We note that, since the Victorian Criminal Charge Book 
was revised following the High Court’s decision in Getachew, it has included the 
following suggested directions concerning an accused’s belief in consent:
There is a difference between a belief in consent which [the accused] relies 
upon and an awareness that [the complainant] was not or might not be 
consenting, which is what this element is about. That is because there are 
different strengths of belief.
• At one end of the scale, I might have a belief as to something and the 
strength of that belief leaves no possibility for error.
• At the other end of the scale, I can have a belief as to something while 
being aware that I might be mistaken. For example, I might believe that I 
parked my car on the fourth level of a car park, but I’m aware that it might 
be on the third level. I then go to the fourth level to find my car, even 
though I’m aware it might not be there.
In order to prove this element of awareness, the prosecution must prove to 
you that [the accused] did not have such a strong belief that [the complainant] 
was consenting that he did not think of the possibility that she might not be 
consenting. In determining the strength of [the accused’s] belief in consent, 
you should consider the matters I just mentioned that are relevant to 
whether the belief was held. This includes any evidence of the belief, 
whether the accused was aware that [describe relevant s. 36 or s. 37AAA(d) or (e) 
circumstances], whether the accused took steps to find out whether the 
complainant was consenting and any other relevant factors …36
Though the Court of Appeal spoke of what it termed ‘belief’ at opposite 
ends of a scale that is predicated upon the strength of conviction with 
which a belief is held, it is the writer’s view that a belief held so fervently 
that it excludes any possibility of doubt amounts to nothing more than a 
convoluted description of the mens rea known as knowledge or awareness. 
Irrespective of whether one opts to characterise such a state of mind as 
knowledge/awareness or the type of belief depicted above by the Court of 
Appeal, it is clear that either state of mind, if found by a jury to have been 
held by the accused at the time of the alleged sexual penetration, would 
preclude a finding that the accused possessed the necessary mens rea for 
rape.
34 NT v The Queen [2012] VSCA 213 (6 September 2012) at [11]–[12].
35 Ibid. at [12]–[13], citing The Queen v Getachew [2012] HCA 10, (2012) 286 ALR 196 at 
[26]–[27].
36 NT v The Queen [2012] VSCA 213 (6 September 2012) at [15] (footnote omitted).
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On the other hand, if a state of mind contemplates the possibility of 
error, however slight, it is descriptive of the mens rea that is commonly 
termed as ‘belief’. Belief, therefore, falls short of the requisite knowledge 
or awareness that the complainant is not or might not be consenting. To 
the contrary, a mere belief in consent which, by definition, contemplates 
the possibility or an even greater likelihood that the complainant might 
not be consenting, is tantamount to the mens rea required for rape at 
common law and under s. 38. The literal wording of the above-quoted 
passages from NT, when read in conjunction with Getachew, leads 
inexorably to the conclusion that the Morgan precept which has been 
reaffirmed by the High Court of Australia and other appellate courts on 
numerous occasions in recent years, has now been abolished under the 
current Australian common law doctrine.
There is a very fine, but clearly discernible distinction, between a 
strongly held belief and one that precludes any possibility of error. The 
principle espoused in Morgan was ostensibly sound because the legal 
community accepted it uncritically and failed to draw the critically 
important distinction between knowledge/awareness and belief. In 
hindsight, however, both Getachew and NT have correctly noted that this 
distinction is not a mere formality, but one that has literally forced the 
courts to rethink the Morgan principle. The logical consequence of this 
rethinking process is that the Morgan principle has been reshaped rather 
than abrogated in its entirety. 
The Victorian Court of Appeal’s attempts to reconcile  
s. 37AA with the consent and mens rea elements of rape
Notwithstanding the fact that Getachew 37 and NT 38 have significantly 
reshaped the Morgan precept in a manner that will necessitate the repeal 
or amendment of s. 37AA(b)(i) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), it is apparent 
that even prior to these cases, the wording of this subsection could not be 
reconciled with the consent and mens rea elements of rape at common law 
or under Victoria’s statutory regime. Readers will recall that the first 
sentence of s. 36 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) defines consent as free 
agreement,39 but the following sentence of s. 36 augments that definition 
with what appears to be an exhaustive list of circumstances40 in which 
consent will be deemed as lacking.41 Under s. 38 of Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), 
37 [2012] HCA 10, (2012) 286 ALR 196.
38 [2012] VSCA 213 (6 September 2012).
39 Readers will recall that at common law, consent is defined as free and conscious 
permission: R v Wilkes and Bryant [1965] VR 475 at 480. Thus, if the complainant 
accedes to sexual penetration out of force, fear of force or any other type of harm, no 
consent has been given. As Victoria is a common law jurisdiction and the language of 
the first sentence of s. 36 is somewhat ambiguous in defining consent as ‘free 
agreement’ rather than ‘free and conscious permission’, arguably s. 36 would be 
construed as consonant with the common law definition expressed in R v Wilkes and 
Bryant.
40 For a discussion of the scope and meaning of ‘consent’ as defined by s. 36 of the Crimes 
Act 1958 (Vic), see K. J. Arenson, ‘Ignorance of the Law as a Defence to Rape: The 
Destruction of a Maxim’ (2012) 76 JCL 336 at 341–3.
41 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s. 36(a)–(g).
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rape can be committed in three different scenarios, all of which require a 
lack of consent on the part of the complainant and an awareness on the 
part of the accused that the complainant is not or might not be consenting42 
or, alternatively, without giving any thought as to whether the complainant 
is consenting.43 Thus, according to the unambiguous language of ss 36 and 
38, an accused who sexually penetrates, continues to sexually penetrate 
or compels a person to sexually penetrate another while aware that the 
complainant is not consenting, has satisfied the elements of rape under 
any of the provisions of s. 38. It is axiomatic, therefore, that an accused 
who partakes in any of the aforementioned types of sexual penetration or 
compels another to do so while aware that free and conscious permission 
is lacking, or that one of the consent negating circumstances enumerated 
in s. 36 is operating—has committed the offence of rape. 
Yet if that is so, how does one explain the arcane and circular language 
of s. 37AA(b)(i) which provides that an accused’s awareness that one or 
more of the s. 36 circumstances is operating at the time of the alleged 
penetration is merely a factor for the jury to consider in deciding whether 
the accused was aware that the complainant was not consenting or might 
not be consenting? Indeed, the only plausible construction of s. 37AA(b)
(i) is that a jury’s finding that the mens rea for rape is satisfied is merely a 
factor for them to consider in making its determination as to whether the 
mens rea for rape has been satisfied. Cognisant of the nonsensical wording 
of this subsection, I have previously offered the following explanation:
< Q >
Simply stated, if a jury finds under s. 37AA(b)(i) that the accused was aware 
‘that a circumstance specified in s. 36 existed in relation to the complainant’, 
how could it reach any conclusion other than that the accused was aware that 
the complainant was not consenting to the sexual penetration? Given that s. 36 
enumerates the circumstances under which consent is negated, how can an 
accused be aware that one or more of those circumstances is operating in 
relation to the complainant and, at the same time, hold a bona fide belief that 
the complainant was consenting? Thus, s. 37AA(b)(i) is, on its face, a paragon 
of superfluous and circular reasoning in stating that juries must be directed that 
one factor they must consider in determining whether the accused possessed 
the requisite mens rea to convict for the crime of rape is whether the accused did 
in fact possess such a mens rea …
Notwithstanding that the Victorian Court of Appeal has reaffirmed the 
Morgan principle on numerous occasions, it has somehow concluded time and 
again that an accused can be aware that one or more of the circumstances set 
out in s. 36 is operating in relation to the complainant and, at the same time, 
hold a genuine belief that the complainant was consenting. How can the court’s 
conclusion be justified in view of the Morgan precept and the degree of clarity 
with which the lack of consent and mens rea elements of rape are enunciated 
under ss 36 and 38 of the Act respectively? In the writer’s view, there is only 
one possible explanation …
[W]hile the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse denotes that the 
law does not require the prosecution to prove that the accused intended to 
violate the law in order to convict, the Court of Appeal has eschewed this 
maxim as a means of reconciling the palpable conflict between the Morgan 
42 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s. 38(2)(a)(i) and (b), (4).
43 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s. 38(2)(a)(ii), (3)–(4).
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principle, the lack of consent and mens rea elements of rape, and the paradoxical 
language of s. 37AA(b)(i). Thus, the recent line of authority suggests that unless 
it can be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was also aware that 
the circumstances enumerated in s. 36 are those in which consent is not given, 
he or she is entitled to an acquittal on the charge of rape irrespective of whether 
he or she was aware or reckless as to the fact that one or more of those 
circumstances existed in relation to the complainant; that is, provided that 
evidence is led that he or she acted with a bona fide belief that the complainant 
was consenting …
When confronted with the duty of giving ss 36 … 38 and … 37AA(b)(i) their 
intended effect, and faced with the irreconcilable conflict among them, the 
Court of Appeal apparently relied on the rule of interpretation that presumes 
legislation is not to be construed as redundant. Had the Court of Appeal 
conceded that one cannot be aware that one or more of the circumstances 
enumerated in s. 36 exists in relation to the complainant and, at the same time, 
hold a belief that he or she was consenting, that would have inexorably 
compelled the court to hold that s. 37AA(b)(i) is redundant, thereby violating a 
cardinal tenet of statutory construction. Confronted with this dilemma, the 
court opted for an interpretation of these conflicting provisions that, while 
obviating the need to declare s. 37AA(b)(i) redundant, violated the maxim that 
ignorance of the law is no excuse. Under the circumstances, therefore, one 
should not be too inclined to fault the court for casting aside this maxim as an 
alternative to violating the longstanding rule of interpretation that legislation 
should not be construed as superfluous.44
Aware of the presumption that legislation is not to be construed as 
redundant as well as its duty to give effect to the intention of Parliament,45 
would such an approach to resolving these conflicting provisions truly 
give the legislation its intended effect? Is it plausible that Parliament 
intended to destroy the storied maxim that ignorance of the law is not a 
defence in prosecutions for rape, a crime that evokes as much, if not more 
passion and revulsion than any offence with the possible exception of 
murder? Is it plausible that in so doing, Parliament also intended to impose 
an impediment to convictions for rape that could rarely be surmounted? 
As the answers to these questions are patently obvious, and in the absence 
of any remedial legislation to deal with this chaotic state of the law, the 
Court of Appeal made another futile attempt to give s 37AA its intended 
effect.46 
44 Arenson, above n. 40 at 344–7 (footnotes omitted).
45 In opining on its intended effect, the High Court in Getachew noted that when read in 
conjunction with s. 37, s. 37AA directions are required whenever ‘evidence is led or an 
assertion is made that the accused believed that the complainant was consenting to the 
sexual act’: The Queen v Getachew (2012) 286 ALR 196. In other words, s. 37AA, like its 
predecessor (s. 37(1)(c)), was intended to direct juries on what was then the Morgan 
precept that although an accused’s genuine belief in consent need not be based on 
reasonable grounds in order to necessitate an acquittal, the reasonableness of the 
putative belief is a relevant factor for the jury to consider in its determination as to 
whether the belief was actually held. The now repealed s. 37(1)(c) of the Crimes Act 
1958 (Vic) provided: ‘[I]n considering the accused’s alleged belief that the complainant 
was consenting to the sexual act, it must take into account whether the belief was 
reasonable in all the relevant circumstances ...’ (emphasis added).
46 GC v The Queen [2013] VSCA 139 (14 June 2013).
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GC v The Queen
In GC v The Queen,47 the trial judge declined to follow a long line of Victorian 
authority48 by directing the jury that the mens rea for rape is satisfied if the 
prosecution proves that the accused was aware that any of the circumstances 
stipulated in ss 36(a), (b) or (c) existed at the time of the relevant sexual 
penetration.49 The accused was convicted and appealed on the ground that 
the judge’s direction constituted an error amounting to a substantial 
miscarriage of justice.50
In rejecting the appellant’s contention and affirming the conviction, 
Buchanan, Harper and Tate JJA went to great lengths to distinguish the 
s. 36 deeming provisions relied upon by the prosecution (s. 36(a), (b) and 
(c)) from all of the others. In drawing this distinction, the following 
passages from the court’s unanimous opinion are most instructive:
< Q >
The complainant in R v Getachew was asleep when the accused sexually 
penetrated her. Accordingly, the circumstance negating her free agreement to 
sexual intercourse with the accused was that found in paragraph (d) of s 36 of 
the Act. Establishing that circumstance, that the complainant was asleep, did 
not involve proof of any effect of sleep upon the complainant’s state of mind. In 
the present case, the relevant s 36 circumstances were those contained in 
paragraphs (a) to (c), which do require proof of a causal connection between 
the conduct directed at the complainant and the complainant’s submission to 
the act of penetration. In order to negate consent in this case the Crown was 
obliged to establish that the complainant submitted because of force or fear of 
force exerted by the appellant or fear of harm by the appellant or because she 
was unlawfully detained by the appellant. 
If an accused person is aware that the complainant’s submission is due to 
force or fear of force or fear of harm or unlawful detention, the accused must 
be taken to be aware of the complainant’s lack of consent. This is because of the 
significant differences in the statutory language between paragraphs (a)–(c) of 
s 36 and the other circumstances identified in s 36. Paragraphs (a)–(c) require 
that the submission of the complainant was ‘because of’ force or fear of force or 
fear of harm or unlawful detention. On an ordinary understanding of the terms 
of paragraph (a), if a person submits to an act ‘because of’ force, then but for 
that force he or she would not have consented. Submitting to a sexual act 
‘because of’ force is not consistent with submitting freely. This is to be 
distinguished from those circumstances where a complainant freely agrees to a 
sexual act in which force is involved; in those circumstances we do not consider 
that the complainant is submitting ‘because of’ force. A jury which finds that 
the circumstance under paragraph (a) of s 36 is made out has in effect rejected 
any version of the events that there was free agreement to sexual activity 
47 Above n. 46.
48 Worsnop v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 187; Getachew v The Queen [2011] VSCA 164 (2 June 
2011); Roberts v The Queen [2011] VSCA 162 (2 June 2011); Neal v The Queen (2010) 32 
VR 454; Wilson v The Queen (2011) 33 VR 340; Halamboulis v The Queen; DPP v 
Halamboulis [2011] VSCA 449 (22 December 2012) at [23].
49 GC v The Queen [2013] VSCA 139 at [20]. 
50 Ibid. at [11]. For a case expounding on what amounts to a substantial miscarriage of 
justice in criminal proceedings see Prasad v R (1994) 119 ALR 399.
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coupled with force or violence. The same reasoning applies to the circumstances 
identified in paragraphs (b) and (c) of s 36.51
While it is certainly true that the words ‘because of’ in s. 36(a), (b) and (c) 
denote the requirement of a causal nexus between the accused’s conduct 
directed at the complainant and the fact of his or her submission, 
conspicuously absent from the justices’ analysis is any explanation as to 
why that alone should place those paragraphs in a different category than 
the other four deeming provisions; namely, that an accused’s awareness of 
the existence any of the circumstances enumerated in s. 36(a), (b) and (c), 
if proved to the satisfaction of the jury, should require the jury to find also 
that the accused was aware that the complainant was not or might not be 
consenting. Although s. 36(d)–(g) do not employ the ‘because of’ language, 
s. 36 is conspicuously devoid of the distinction drawn by the court and 
expressly states that ‘circumstances in which a person does not freely 
agree to an act’ include these paragraphs. Furthermore, as indicated in the 
clear language of ss 35(1)(a) and (b), 36 and 38, the provisions which 
collectively define the elements of rape in Victoria, all that is required to 
satisfy the mens rea of s. 38 is that the accused be aware that one or more 
of the circumstances stipulated in s. 36(a)–(g)—or some other factor that 
would negate free and conscious permission under the first sentence of 
s. 36—existed at the time of the sexual penetration in question.52 
In addition, the very wording of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in GC 
is inherently paradoxical. In particular, the court’s pronouncement that ‘It 
follows that if the submission of a complainant is obtained “because of” 
force, and an accused is aware that the submission was obtained “because 
of” force’,53 the accused must be aware that the submission was not 
obtained by the complainant’s free agreement is rather inane. In particular, 
the word ‘submission’ is defined as ‘the state in which someone has to 
accept the control of another person’.54 Ipso facto, the word ‘submission’ 
can never be reconciled with the notion of free and conscious permission; 
that is to say that because a person’s ‘submission’ can never be obtained by 
the complainant’s free agreement, the above-quoted sentence from the 
Court of Appeal’s judgment is utterly superfluous. 
Finally, it is certainly arguable that despite the absence of the words 
‘because of’ in paragraphs (d)–(g) of s. 36, the same ‘but for’ causal nexus 
could be found between the factors set out in these provisions and the fact 
that sexual penetration occurred. Regardless of whether one’s actual will 
is overcome or not, the express language of s. 36 leaves no doubt that 
consent to sexual penetration is deemed to be negated when any of the 
s. 36 provisions are operating at the relevant time. While the judiciary has 
both the duty and inherent authority to develop the common law 
51 GC v The Queen [2013] VSCA 139 at [19]–[20] (emphasis added).
52 Alternatively, and on the questionable assumption that one could properly categorise it 
as a mens rea, s. 38(2)(a)(ii), (3) and (4)(b)(ii) provide that an accused (who lacks an 
awareness that the complainant is not or might not be consenting) can also be convicted 
if the prosecution is able to prove that the accused gave no thought as to whether the 
complainant was consenting.
53 GC v The Queen [2013] VSCA 139 at [21].
54 Collins Australian Compact Dictionary, 5th edn (HarperCollins: 2002) 920.
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incrementally, especially in cases where there are statutory ambiguities,55 
a very fine line exists between the incremental development of the 
common law and the usurpation of legislative power embodied in the s. 
36 deeming provisions that fall exclusively within the province of the 
legislative branch of government. In the writer’s view, the Court of Appeal 
crossed that line in GC 56 by construing the unambiguous deeming 
provisions of s. 36 in a manner that comports with what it considered to 
be a fair and just result.57
For all of the reasons noted, therefore, the Court of Appeal’s analysis 
and holding in GC58 cannot withstand careful scrutiny. Rather, it represents 
yet another attempt to placate the long line of Victorian Court of Appeal 
authority that has steadfastly and unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile 
the unfortunate language of s. 37AA(b)(i) with ss 35(1)(a) and (b), 36 and 
38 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). These unsuccessful attempts are 
reminiscent of the old aphorism, ‘One cannot fit a round peg into a square 
hole’.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated that even prior to the decisions 
of the High Court and Victorian Court of Appeal in Getachew59 and NT60 
respectively, the arcane and circular language of s. 37AA(b)(i) could not 
be reconciled with ss 35(1)(a) and (b), 36 and 38 which collectively define 
the elements of rape in Victoria. This has been exacerbated by the fact that 
the obiter dicta in Getachew61 that was adopted by the Court of Appeal in 
NT 62 requires that s. 37AA be repealed or amended to reflect that the 
Morgan principle has been reshaped to mandate, as a prerequisite to 
procuring an acquittal, that the accused must have acted with knowledge/
awareness, and not merely an honest belief, that the complainant was 
consenting to the relevant sexual penetration. The time is long overdue 
for the Victorian Parliament to take the necessary remedial measures not 
only to bring s. 37AA in line with Getachew 63 and NT,64 but also to eliminate 
55 The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia noted that ‘[i]n many instances the 
generality of the statutory language is deliberate and allows the courts to develop a body 
of law to fill the gaps’: Telstra Corp. Ltd v Treloar (2000) 102 FCR 595 at 603. See also 
Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 at 309: ‘In modern times, the function of the 
courts in developing the common law has been freely acknowledged’ (Brennan J), 
citing Myers v Director of Public Prosecutions [1965] AC 1001 at 1021; Mutual Life & Citizens’ 
Assurance Co. Ltd v Evatt (1968) 122 CLR 556 at 563; Geelong Harbor Trust Commissioners v 
Gibbs Bright & Co. [1974] AC 810 at 820–1. For an explanation of the separation of 
powers principle, see generally J. E. Novak and R. D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law, 4th 
edn (West, 1991) 126–8.
56 GC v The Queen [2013] VSCA 139.
57 See Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). ‘[I]t is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is’: ibid. at 177.
58 [2013] VSCA 139.
59 (2012) 286 ALR 196.
60 [2012] VSCA 213 (6 September 2012).
61 (2012) 286 ALR 196 at 203.
62 [2012] VSCA 213 (6 September 2012) at [12]–[16].
63 (2012) 286 ALR 196.
64 [2012] VSCA 213 (6 September 2012).
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the erroneous and circular wording of s. 37AA(b)(i).65 Decisions such as 
GC 66 represent a clear manifestation that the language of this subsection 
has catapulted the law of rape in Victoria into such a chaotic state that 
unless remedial legislation is immediately forthcoming, both the County 
Court judges and the Court of Appeal justices will be forced to resort to 
one form of sophistry after another in order to make that round peg fit 
into the square hole. 
65 At the time of writing the Victorian Parliament had not evinced any intention to reform 
the provisions under scrutiny here, despite the many flaws of the current state of the 
law being the subject of much scholarly debate. For a thorough critique of the status of 
jury directions in Victoria, see Justice Mark Weinberg, ‘The Criminal Law—A “Mildly 
Vituperative” Critique’ (2011) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 1177 at 1184–1195; 
Justice William Young, ‘Summing-Up to Juries in Criminal Cases—What Jury Research 
Says about Current Rules and Practice’ [2003] Crim LR 665. For a general statement of 
dissatisfaction with the state of the law relating to sexual offences, see, e.g. A. Flynn and 
N. Henry, ‘Disputing Consent: The Role of Jury Directions in Victoria’ (2012) 24 Current 
Issues in Criminal Justice 167.
66 [2013] VSCA 139.
